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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH, Department
of Human Services, ex. rel.
DIANA W. MOBLEY
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
GEORGE C. MOBLEY,

Case No. 930299-CA

Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sections 78-2a-3(2)(h) and 78-45-10(1992), whereby the
parties in a district court domestic relations case may take an
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order regarding child
support.

Further, a judgment of criminal contempt is appealable

as a matter of right.
(Utah 1988).

Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167

In this case, the final order was issued by the

Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes, rules and constitutional
provisions are contained in Addendum A:
Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1992)
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Did the court comply with the procedures mandated by

Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the treatment of
the Affidavit

for the Removal

of a Judge

submitted

by the

Defendant/Appellant?
Standard of Review:

No deference is accorded the trial

court on questions of procedure.

Barnard v. Murphy, 212 Utah

Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1993).
B.

Was the Defendant/Appellant denied due process of law

through the court's failure to ground the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

of

Law

in

sufficient

evidence,

particularly

the

finding of ability to pay on the part of Defendant/Appellant and
the finding of no just cause existing for failure to make child
support payments.
Standard of Review:

Findings of fact shall not be set

aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a).

However, finding should be sufficiently detailed and

include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the

ultimate

conclusion

on each

factual

issue

was

reached.

Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
C.

Was the Defendant/Appellant denied due process of law

when the court found Defendant/Appellant in contempt of court and
ordered him to jail, by failing to address the difference between
direct

and

indirect

contempt

and

failing

to

address

the

alternative of community service, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-32-12.1(5).
2

Standard of Review:

A trial court's determination of

criminal contempt will be reversed

for abuse of discretion.

Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991).
D.

Does the enforcement of the child support laws of the

State of Utah using criminal contempt powers conflict with the
13th Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 United
States Code 1994 (1992)?
Standard of Review:

A question of law is reviewed for

correctness, and accorded no particular deference.

Carter v.

Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 30, 1993, the Honorable John A. Rokich found the
Defendant/Appellant in contempt and ordered his commitment to the
Salt Lake County Jail for thirty days forthwith.

The Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Contempt were signed April
2, 1993. The Notice of Appeal was filed on April 29, 1993.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Following trial on July 19, 1989, a Decree of Divorce was
entered on August 17, 1989, by the Honorable John A. Rokich,
Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

Among other things, the Defendant was ordered to pay child

support and alimony in twice-monthly payments, and $7,500.00 in
past due temporary support.

On December 13, 1989, the State of

Utah filed an Ex Parte Motion for Joinder of Parties and on
December 26, 1989, an Order for Joinder of Parties was signed by
3

the Honorable John A, Rokich, Judge, Third District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
On November 27, 1992, the State of Utah filed a Motion for
an Order to Show Cause in the above-captioned case, in which the
State sought judgment for child support and alimony arrearages
and an order holding the Defendant in contempt of court.

On

November 30, 1992, the court issued an Order to Show Cause.

A

hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on January 20, 1993,
before

Third

District

Court

Defendant appeared pro se.

Commissioner

Thomas

N.

Arnett.

The Commissioner recommended that the

issue of contempt be certified for hearing before Judge Rokich.
On March 30, 1993, a hearing on the Order to Show Cause was
held before Judge Rokich.
witnesses were present.

Defendant again appeared pro se.

No

The State made a proffer of evidence and

asked that the Defendant be found in contempt and be subject to
the powers of the court.

The Defendant responded by making a

Motion to Continue based on an Affidavit for the Removal of a
Judge filed March 29, 1993.

The Motion to Continue was denied by

the court (T. 3), as was the request to remove the judge for bias
(T. 3).

The court declined to follow the procedure for removal

of a judge outlined in Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rule 63(b) was cited by the Defendant in his oral

argument and in his affidavit.
The court indicated

that Defendant's memorandum,

Written

Arguments for Evidentuary Hearing March 30, 1993 (sic), had been
read and found to be "meritless, absolutely meritless." (T. 4).
The court found the Defendant in contempt of court and sentenced
4

him to jail for 30 days forthwith ("Put the handcuffs on him and
take him over to jail.") (T.4).

For the record the court found

that the Defendant "failed to make payment; he has the ability to
pay and has refused to acknowledge his obligation to provide for
his family." (T. 4).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant argues that he timely filed an affidavit in
support of a motion to recuse the judge, and that the judge
failed to follow the clear mandate of Rule 63(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial court then held an Order to

Show Cause hearing on the issue of Defendant's non-payment of
child support, and failed to make adequate findings of fact.

The

trial court found Defendant in criminal contempt of court and
committed

him

forthwith

to

jail

for

thirty

affording the Defendant his constitutional rights.

days,

without

Finally, the

trial court's criminal contempt order violated the Defendant's
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROCEDURE MANDATED BY RULE 63(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S TIMELY REQUEST
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file
affidavit that the judge before whom such action
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney
5

or
an
or
or
or

in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, except to call in
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is
known.
If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of
the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit.
If the judge against whom the
affidavit is directed does not question the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally
sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the
case or determine the matter in question.
No party
shall be entitled in any case to file more than one
affidavit: and no such affidavit shall be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that
such affidavit and application are in good faith.
Defendant first argues that his affidavit, filed March 29,
1993, the day before the Order to Show Cause hearing scheduled
for March 30, 1993, was timely filed.

On November 30, 1992, the

State filed an Order to Show Cause with the court, resuming the
litigation

of this case.

The Return

of Service

was filed

December 18, 1992, and a hearing was set before Commissioner
Arnett on January 20, 1993.

At the hearing on January 20, 1993,

the Commissioner certified the issue of contempt
before Judge Rokich.
pleading

titled

for hearing

On February 1, 1993, Defendant filed a

Objection

to

District

Court

Commissioner's

Recommendation, and on February 2, 1993, filed a pleading titled
Notice to Submit

for Decision,

among others.

A hearing on

Defendant's Notice to Submit for Decision on his Objection to
6

District Court Commissioner's Recommendation was set for February
26, 1993, and then continued by the court to March 30, 1993.
On February 17, 1993, Defendant filed a Motion for Waiver of
Payment of Fees and a Notice to Submit for Decision, which was
scheduled for March 12, 1993, before Judge Rokich.

Although the

court struck the hearing as improperly before the court, the
court did rule to deny the Defendant's motion for waiver of
payment of fees.

In his Affidavit for Removal of Judge the

Defendant cites the events of the March 12 hearing as part of the
basis for his Affidavit.

Defendant filed his Affidavit 17 days

later on March 29, 1993, prior to the hearing on the Order to
Show Cause and before any evidence was taken or rulings were
made.
While Rule 63(b) imposes no specific time limitation on the
filing of a motion for disqualification, in Madsen v. Prudential
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988), the court held that
timeliness is essential.
judge

should

be

filed

"To be timely, a motion to disqualify a
at counsel's

first

opportunity

learning of the disqualifying facts." Madsen at 543.

after

In Madsen

the moving party waited 39 days after the disqualifying facts
were made known and the trial court had ruled on the substantive
issues before

filing

their motion.

As the reviewing

court

pointed out, "[A] party who has a reasonable basis for moving to
disqualify a judge may not delay in the hope of first obtaining a
favorable

ruling

and

then

unfavorable. Madsen at 542.

complain

only

if

the

result

is

The court in Madsen indicated that

the affidavit of prejudice and motion to disqualify should have
7

taken no more than ten days to prepare and file.

In Birch v.

Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), the trial judge, faced
with a Rule 63(b) motion, reassigned the case to another judge
who found the supporting affidavit to be legally insufficient and
denied

the

motion.

timeliness.

The

reviewing

court

first

considered

"As a prerequisite to considering the merits of

Birch's claim, we must first determine whether his challenge was
timely filed. Birch at 1116.

Because Birch waited 88 days after

the trial court had entered its judgment and after the facts
alleged in the affidavit were known, the court found defendant's
motion to be untimely and denied relief.
In the present case, Defendant's first appearance before
Judge Rokich in four years came on March 12, 1993.

Both parties

were reprimanded by the judge for scheduling the hearing and
Defendant's Motion for Waiver of Payment of Fees was summarily
denied. See Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge.

Defendant

recalled the summary fashion in which his divorce trial had been
handled by the judge, and was concerned that he was not being
accorded

due process

as a party

or

as a pro

se

litigant.

Defendant, proceeding pro se, then filed his affidavit under Rule
63(b) on March 29.

Thus, Defendant filed his affidavit 17 days

after the facts indicating bias became known to him.

Although

this is one week longer than the ten days cited in Madsen, the
Madsen

deadline

familiarity

was

with

directed

the

Rules

at
of

counsel

Civil

and

presumes

Procedure.

some

Here

the

Defendant, proceeding pro se, was able to marshal facts, locate
and

cite

the

correct

rule,

and
8

file

the

affidavit

in

a

comparatively
affidavit

reasonable time.

Further, Defendant

filed his

prior to the pending hearing, and did not seek to

disqualify the judge only after an unfavorable ruling had been
made.

See Madsen at 543.

Finally, at no time did the State

object to the timeliness of Defendant's Affidavit for the Removal
of a Judge.

The State, present at the hearing on March 30, 1993

and author of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
of Contempt, waived any objection by their failure to object on
the issue of timeliness.

See generally State v. Schreuder, 726

P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986).
For relief, the Defendant's affidavit requested that the
evidentiary hearing be continued.

He again moved to continue the

hearing orally on March 30, 1993, and asked the judge to take
notice of his affidavit and to follow the procedures outlined in
Rule 63(b).
Defendant's

The court denied both requests.
motion

to

continue,

the

court

First, as to
stated,

"That's

denied". (T. 3). The court next denied Defendant's motion under
Rule 63(b), stating that, "[T]here's no bias[.]" (T.3), and "I am
not recusing myself in the case[.]

I have no basis upon which to

recuse myself." (T. 4).
The

trial

court

failed

to

comply

with

the

procedures

r

mandated by Rule 63(b).

In Barnard v. Murphy, 212 Utah Adv. Rep.

19 (Utah App. 1993), the reviewing court made clear that the
trial court must comply with the procedure outlined
63(b).
whom

in Rule

"The clear import of Rule 63(b) is that a judge against

the

affidavit

is

directed

must

either

recuse

him-

or

herself, or if he or she questions the legal sufficiency of the
9

affidavit, certify the matter to another named judge for a ruling
on its legal sufficiency."

Barnard at 20.

The trial court in

the present case did neither, but rather ruled in its own favor
on the issue of bias, which is error under Rule 63(b).

POINT II: THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF
FACT
At the evidentiary hearing on March 30, 1993, the Plaintiff
proffered numerous facts in support of their allegation that the
defendant was in contempt of court by his failure to pay child
support. (T.2-3).

When asked to respond, the Defendant made a

motion to continue, essentially renewing the motion to continue
contained in the Affidavit for Removal of Judge filed March 29,
1993.

The Court denied the motion. (T. 3).

Defendant next

brought the affidavit to the attention of the Court, and the
Court denied the motion to recuse, saying there was no bias.

The

Court then found Defendant in contempt of court and had him
immediately handcuffed and taken to jail.

Prior to leaving the

courtroom, the Defendant asked the Court to state findings and
conclusions.

The Court stated, "The findings are that he failed

to make payment; he has the ability to pay and has refused to
acknowledge his obligation to provide for his family." (T. 4).
The Defendant replied, "I have not refused.

Your honor, I have

not— I do not have the ability to pay" (T. 5). He was then led
away in chains.

10

The Plaintiff prepared a document titled Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law and Order of Contempt, which was submitted to
the Court for signature.

The mailing certificate indicates that

the document was mailed to the Defendant

as his address of

record, even though the Plaintiff had reason to know that the
Defendant was incarcerated for 30 days in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

The document submitted by the Plaintiff is replete with

errors.

The Court made no findings on the record with respect

the findings of fact cited in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Although the Plaintiff made a general proffer in open court as to
those facts, no evidence in support of the proffer was introduced
and the Court cited no evidence in support of its oral findings.
The Defendant certainly did not stipulate to the proffer, and he
was not permitted to cross-examine the evidentiary basis of the
proffer.
The Court also failed to address the evidence and argument
presented by the Defendant.

On March 29, 1993, the Defendant

filed with the court a document titled Written Arguments for
Evidentiary Hearing March 30, 1993 (sic).
Defendant
defenses

challenges
against

the

the

allegations

imposition

of

documentary evidence of his income.

In the document the

against
contempt,

him,

asserts

and

provides

The Court on the record

fails to make findings as to any of the Defendant's contentions,
either for or against.
The general rule governing findings of facts is that they
must

be

sufficiently

detailed

for

the

reviewing

court

to

understand how the trial court applied the proper rule of law to
11

specific

facts

in

reaching

its

conclusions

of

law.

"The

importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact
in a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of
dispute under the proper rule of law.

To that end the findings

should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached."

Rucker v. Dal ton,, 598 P. 2d

1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).

To challenge the trial court's factual

findings

must

the

appellant

marshal

the

evidence.

Where,

however, as here, the trial court has failed to enter detailed
findings, the appellant is excused from the marshaling effort.
"There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot
meaningfully challenged

as factual determinations.

In other

words, the way to attack findings which appear to be complete and
which are sufficiently detailed is to marshal the supporting
evidence and then demonstrate the evidence
sustain such findings.
caliber,
exercise.

appellant

But where the findings are not of that

need

Rather,

is inadequate to

not

go

appellant

through
can

a

simply

futile

marshaling

argue

the

insufficiency of the court's findings as framed."

legal

Woodward v.

Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991).
In the present case, the Court failed to articulate any
subsidiary facts on the record in support of its findings.
Ostler v. Ostler,

789 P. 2d

713

(Utah App.

In

1990) the court

enunciated the seven factors the trial court must consider in
awarding prospective child support after a material change of
12

circumstances under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2) (1987).

"Because

these factors 'constitute material issues upon which the trial
court must enter

fact,!

findings of

(citation omitted),

the

failure to enter specific findings on each of the factors is
generally reversible error... ."

Ostler at 715.

In the present

case the Court addressed none of these factors in finding that
the Defendant had the ability to pay, despite the Defendants
objections.

The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails

to

detailed

enter

determination.

findings

concerning

child

support

Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1990).

Again, in Woodward, a case involving the termination of parental
rights,

the court

uncontrovertedly

states,

support[s]"

[U]nless

the

the trial

record

court's

"clearly

and

decision,

the

absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand
for more detailed findings by the trial court.

Id. at 478.

POINT III: THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
WHEN THE COURT FOUND DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT
ORDERED HIM TO JAIL, BY FAILING TO ADDRESS
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTEMPT
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

LAW
AND
THE
AND

In finding that Defendant was in contempt of court, the
Court said, on the record, "[T]he findings are that he failed to
make payment; he has the ability to pay and has refused to
acknowledge his obligation to provide for his family." (T. 4).
The

Court

forthwith.

ordered

the

Apart

from

Defendant

to

the question

jail

for

of whether

thirty

days

the court's

findings of fact were adequate to support the order of contempt,

13

two issues must be considered

in order to determine

process was accorded the Defendant.
direct

or

indirect,

and

second,

if due

First, was the contempt

was

the

contempt

civil

or

elements

of

criminal?
The

trial

court's

conclusions

address

the

contempt but fail to state specific facts in support thereof.
"As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to
comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited
for contempt know what was required, had the ability to comply,
and

intentionally

failed

or refused

to do

Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1973).

so.

Coleman v.

Again, the trial court

failed to make adequate findings of fact, since the above-quoted
basis for imposing contempt is a conclusion of law and there are
no subsidiary facts in support thereof on the record.

Apart from

the Plaintiff's proffer and the Plaintiff's Findings of Facts,
there is no evidence that the Defendant had the ability to comply
or that the Defendant intentionally failed or refused to do so.
The issue of whether contempt was direct or indirect is
important because of the different procedural protections that
must be afforded under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment

to the United State Constitution.

Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982).

See Burgers v.

Contempt is direct when

it is committed in the presence of the judge, and is indirect
when it is committed outside the presence of the judge.

Direct

contempt may be punished summarily under Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3
(1992).

For indirect contempt to be found, however, the due

process clause requires that, "the person charged be advised of
14

the nature of the action against him [or her], have assistance of
counsel, if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and
have the right to offer testimony on his
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d at 1322.

[or her] behalf."

Since the Plaintiff was

required to provide evidence to the Court to prove that the
Defendant was in contempt, the contempt was clearly indirect.
Given what occurred in the courtroom, however, the Defendant was
not accorded due process.

The Defendant was not afforded a

meaningful opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, nor
was he able to offer testimony on his own behalf.

Finally, he

was not given the assistance of counsel, nor was he advised of
such a possibility, and by proceeding pro se he seems to have
earned the enmity of the court.
Similarly, the issue of whether the contempt is categorized
as civil or criminal has due process consequences.

Contempt is

civil if it is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant,
and if the sentence, whether jail or a fine, is conditioned upon
a definite performance by the defendant and may be purged by such
performance.

Contempt is criminal if it is punitive and intended

to vindicate the authority of the court, and if the sentence is
limited to imprisonment for a definite period.

See Hicks ex rel.

Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423 (1988).

"[W]e

now, prospectively only, adopt the Feiock approach as a matter of
state law.

For all future cases, we will follow the rule that a

contempt order is criminal if the fine or sentence imposed is
fixed and unconditional, but is civil if the fine or imprisonment
is conditional such that the contemner can obtain relief from the
15

contempt order merely by doing some act as ordered by the court.
Further, a contempt order is civil if the order is to pay a fine
to the other party rather than to the court."
Thomas, 759 P.2d at 1168, n.5.

Von Hake v.

In the present case the contempt

can only be characterized as criminal because the unconditional
sentence was intended to be punishment, as the Defendant was
ordered to jail forthwith for thirty days without any means to
purge himself of the sentence by the court.
A

further

fundamental

consequence

proposition

that

of

criminal

criminal

contempt

penalties

is,

may

not

"the
be

imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that
the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings, including
the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."

Feiock at 632.

The Plaintiff in the present case has

couched the findings of fact as 'clear and convincing evidence,f
and thereby fails to meet the requisite burden of proof.

The

right to counsel attaches, and an indigent person charged with a
criminal offense has a right to appointed counsel at public
expense.

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006

(1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963);
State v. Vincent, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah App. 1992).

The

Defendant was not given the assistance of counsel, did not waive
assistance of counsel, and was not questioned as to indigency.
The Defendant was incarcerated at the request of the State and by
the order of the Court without the constitutional protections and
fundamental fairness required by due process when he was sent to
jail for thirty days without the assistance of counsel, without
16

the opportunity to confront witnesses, without the opportunity to
testify on his own behalf, upon inadequate factual findings, and
under an erroneously low burden of proof.

POINT IV: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT LAWS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH USING CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWERS
CONFLICTS WITH THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
Defendant, in his Written Arguments for Evidentuary Hearing
March

30,

imposition

1993

(sic),

of contempt

raised

the

following

by the court.

defense

He asserts

to

the

that

the

Plaintiff has alleged an artificially high imputed income for the
Defendant,

so

that

it

appears

that

the

Defendant

financial means to pay his obligation to his children.
failing

to make payment,

Defendant
obligation.

intentionally

the logical
and

inference

willfully

refuses

has

the

Then, by

is that the
to

pay

his

Defendant contends the imputation of income creates

an obligation of work, since if the Defendant does not work the
court presumes willful refusal to pay.

If the court enforces its

order to pay through criminal contempt powers, the Defendant
argues, the court violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
The enabling legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1992), states:
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The holding of any person to service or labor under the
system known as peonage is abolished and forever
prohibited in any Territory or State of the United
States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders,
regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which
have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced,
or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be
made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or
labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any
deft or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and
void.
The term 'peonage' has its origins in Mexico, where a 'peon'
was a person who was compelled to work for his creditor until his
debt was paid.

Peonage is a system of involuntary servitude

based upon indebtedness.

Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207,

25 S.Ct. 429 (1905).

Indebtedness of one person to another is a

condition

to

precedent

the

existence

of

peonage,

and

the

subsequent compulsion of service or work may be enforced through
physical threats or law.

For the purpose of determining whether

a system of peonage existed, work compelled under state law by
the constant threat and fear of imprisonment
rendered the work compulsory.

under such law

United States v. Reynolds, 235

U.S. 133, 35 S.Ct. 86 (1914).
The Thirteenth Amendment

clearly excepts

those individuals convicted of a crime.

from

its ambit

The case law is full of

examples of courts denying relief to individuals who challenged
their incarceration as involuntary servitude.

Where a person is

duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for a crime in
accordance with law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude
arises.

Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963). See also
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Jobson

v.

Henne,

355

F.2d

129

(2d

Cir.

1966)•

However,

imprisonment based upon a conviction where the defendant has not
been afforded the fundamental right to assistance of counsel
violates the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary
servitude.

U.S. v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1955). See also

U. S. ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955)
(incarceration

upon

conviction

without

evidence

imposes

involuntary servitude).
Where the penalty for failure to perform services is other
than incarceration or physical harm, the courts have held that
the requirement of performance is not involuntary servitude.
an

example,

laws

requiring

attorneys

to

represent

As

indigent

defendants without compensation as a condition of practicing law
have been held constitutional.
1211

(6th Cir.

1982).

Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d

Compulsory

state

work

programs

for

recipients of public assistance have been held constitutional,
where

the

reduction

of

benefits,

not

incarceration,

consequence of failure to participate.

is the

Brogan v. San Mateo

County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990).
Courts have considered whether the obligation to work to pay
child

support

is a form of involuntary

thirteenth amendment.

servitude

under the

In Freeman v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554 (D.C.

1979), the court ordered the husband to seek gainful employment
commensurate with his abilities and educational background, and
indicated that failure to pay child support could result in
incarceration.

Imposition of contempt was stayed upon adequate

payments, however, so that the payment option operated as a purge
19

clause, rendering the contempt civil, not criminal.

Likewise, in

Re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859 (111. 1979), the contempt
order was stayed and could be purged by payment of child support.
In the present case the Defendant clearly had a lawful
obligation to support his non-custodial children through payment
of money.

Further, the Court was free to fashion an order to

compel the Defendant to pay that obligation, so long as the order
did not

involve incarceration.

Defendant

to

jail

When

unconditionally

the Court

for

ordered

non-payment

of

the

child

support the Court violated the Defendant's Thirteenth Amendment
rights.

The Defendant was required by the Court to make payment

or to work for money with which to make payment, and when the
Defendant

did not he was incarcerated.

Further,

as argued

previously, Defendant was incarcerated without the assistance of
counsel and without adequate evidence, which was held to be
involuntary

servitude

in U.S. v. Morgan

Caminito v. Murphy, above.
for non-payment

of child

and

U. S. ex rel.

The imposition of criminal contempt
support

in this case violates

the

Thirteenth Amendment.
Finally, Defendant draws the court's attention to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5), which states:
If the court finds be a preponderance of the evidence
that an obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has
refused to pay child support as ordered by a court in
accordance with Title 58, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act, the court may order the
obligor to:
(a) perform community service; and
(b) participate
in
workshops,
classes,
or
individual counseling to educate the obligor about the
20

importance of complying with the court order and
providing the children with a regular and stable source
of support.
It appears the legislature has provided a remedy for non-payment
of child support which is specifically included in the chapter as
an

alternative

to

contempt

and

which

does

not

violate

a

defendant's thirteenth amendment rights.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred when it failed to follow the procedure
outlined in Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact.

The

The trial

court erred when it found the Defendant in criminal contempt and
ordered him to jail without constitutional protections.

The

trial court violated the Defendant's Thirteenth Amendment rights
under

the U.S. Constitution

when

it

committed

him

to

jail

unconditionally for non-payment of child support.
Defendant requests the following relief from this court.
Defendant asks that the case be remanded for reassignment to
another judge consistent with Rule 63(b).

Defendant asks that

the case be remanded for further findings of fact pursuant to a
hearing for modification of child support.

Defendant asks that

the court find that criminal contempt is an unlawful remedy for
non-payment of child support.
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I*
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(*)T

ADDENDUM A

Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1992):
The holding of any person to service or labor under the
system known as peonage is abolished and forever
prohibited in any Territory or State of the United
States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders,
regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which
have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced,
or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be
made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or
labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any
deft or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and
void.
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or
in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, except to call in
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is
known.
If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of
the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit.
If the judge against whom the

affidavit is directed does not question the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally
sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the
case or determine the matter in question.
No party
shall be entitled in any case to file more than one
affidavit: and no such affidavit shall be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that
such affidavit and application are in good faith.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5):
If the court finds be a preponderance of the evidence
that an obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has
refused to pay child support as ordered by a court in
accordance with Title 58, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act, the court may order the
obligor to:
(a) perform community service; and
(b) participate
in
workshops,
classes,
or
individual counseling to educate the obligor about the
importance of complying with the court order and
providing the children with a regular and stable source
of support.

